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Note
This paper is a summary of the first draft of what ®ay eventually 
become a short (45,000 word) book. I should be especially grateful for 
suggestions on now best to strengthen it during a further month's research 
in the'national Archives.
The paper reproduces the first and last chanters of the book in full, 
plus brief summaries of chapters 2-11 which discuss pre-colonial famines and 
the nine major food shortages of the period covered (1096-7, 190>, 1912,
1916, 1922, 1955, 1942, 1947, 1960). I have not included footnotes. i 
should like to thank Dr Beach ana the officers of the National Archives of 
Zimbabwe for their quite exceptional helpfulness.
1. The Problem of Famine
The best way to explain the argument of this book, is to explain how it 
came to be written.
In '1906 I visited Zimbabwe for the first-time in order to•learn as much 
about its history as was possible in twe months. I was especially 
interested in its population history, for this presents three problems to a 
historian. First, the population was surprisingly small when Europeans 
invaded. The first rought estimate in 1y01 suggeted 561,927 indigenous 
Africans. A later census raised this estimate to 700,000. Even if this wa3 
still too low and the real figure was nearer 1 ,000,000, that would still have 
been remarkably small when compares with the 8,100,000 people of ail races 
living in Zimbabwe in 1994- The second problem for the historian, than, is 
why population grew so rapidly during the colonial period. And the third is 
why it grew so early in the colonial period. During the first decade of the 
twentieth century many observers thought tnat the African population was 
increasing. During the second decade almost everyone thought so. A later 
census suggested annual growth rates of 2.'j> per cent between 1301 and 1911 
and 2.4 per cent between 1911 and 1321. Lven if these rates were 
exaggerated by starting from too low a base, the fact tnat population grew 
at ail between 1900 and 1 925 probably made Southern Rhodesiv., as it then 
was, unique in East and Central Africa, for if. is generally believed that 
population elsewhere in the region declined, or at least stagnated, during 
the early colonial pex-iod.
While reading in the National 'Archives of Zimbabwe and pondering these 
questions, I came across a series of files on famine relief during tile early 
! colonial period. They were vivid and detailed and they immediately 
connected with the questions in my mind. They showed that many people died 
in early colonial famines, espeeialy following the great insurrection of 
1896-7, but that famine mortality had declined rapidly during the early 
twentieth century and had ceased almost completely after 1922. This 
:suggested a possible key to Zimbabwe's population history: famine (often 
accompanied by epidemic dx3ease) could have held down the population before 
41S00; the ending of famine mortality could have permitted the rapid 
^population growth of the twentieth century; and the fact that mortality was 
Ichecked so early in the colonial period - earlier than in other African 
teolonies I knew - could explain why Southern Rhodesia's population increased
1
so soon after Uuropeon invasion. This explanation would also fit neatly 
with three other consiiera!:ions. one was a belief in the central importance 
of famine in African history which most historians had learned from the 
disasters of 19f3&--65. The second was that the most convincing account of 
population history anywhere in pre-colonial Africa, Professor Joseph 
filler's study of Angola, argued that famine and disease had indeed been the 
chief constraints on population growth in an environment similar to 
Zimbabwe's. third, hr David Beach had suggested that recurrent drought and 
disaster - shangwa, in the dhona term -■ was a key to understanding 
Zimbabwe's history. It all seemed to fit together.
It was clear, too, that the material in the National Archives bore on a 
debate about the causes and control of famine which has concerned 
historians, social scientists, ana development workers since the beginning of 
this century. The debate originated in India, which experienced several 
appalling famines during the second half of the nineteenth century. Indian 
scholars, led by R.C. Dutt in 1900, argued that altnough these famines were 
caused by c!nought, drought caused famine only because it acted on a society 
impoverished by British policies. While over-taxation, uncontrolled free 
trade, railway const ruction, and other innovations drained wealth out of 
India, the same policies also destroyed indigenous techniques, such as 
household granaries, by which Indians had previously protected themselves 
against scarcity. These changes, so Indian scholars argued, bore especially 
heavily on the poor and the landless, who could not afford to buy food at 
famine prices, so that it was possible for people to starve to death outside 
well-stocked grain stores, as happened in Bengal in 1943-4* dheraas i£ pre- 
colonial India men had starved when there was no food, in colonial India 
poor men starved when they had no money to buy food whicn was available.
The nature of famine itself had changed.
This analysis has recentl,y boor' applied to • h • hr story of famine in 
Africa, especially in Dr Hichsel Watts's work on Hausaland in northern 
Algeria, an area with many environmental similarities to Zimbabwe. .Dr watts 
accepts that famines in this region were chiefly caused by drought and 
occurred at intervals before colonial rule, but he stresses that the ilausa 
people possessed many methods of preventing crop failure or surviving it. 
Their agricultural techniques sought to minimise risk. They stored food.
They pursued supplementary non-agricultural occupations. They lived in 
large families and practised mutual aid. They formed clientage ties with 
powerful men and expected state assistance in times of need. In the 
colonial period, so Dr Watts argues, these resources were eroded, especially 
by the commercialisation of agriculture and by the demands of an -Alien state 
which gave only token aid during famine and impeded the emergence of a truly 
capitalist agriculture whose productivity might have prevented food 
scarcity. As a result, famine became more common (although perhaps less 
severe) in twentieth-century Ilausaland. For the poor, indeed, it was almost 
a permanent condition, a 'drone of continual food shortage'.
Yet. this is only one perspective on the history of famine. Another is 
again best stated for India, especially by Dr Michelle IlcAlpin. In her 
view, India's late nineteenth-century famines were no worse than those 
before colonial rule. The important point was that from the beginning of 
the twentieth century famine ceased to kill large numbers of people, except 
in the special circumstances of Bengal in 194;--4- Scarcity continued to 
• but mortality did -not. famine mortality was achieved .
through many of the sane means which Indian historians of the earlier period 
had blamed for causing famine - railway transport, wider trade, a mobile 
labour market - but also by a general increase in wealth, improved medical
conditions, or..-.] es,n--: is 1 -xj . or-; - f f ieicn i; go vc crimen t;. A key e lement in the 
growth of governmental competence was the compilation during the 1670s and 
1680s of the Indian famine Codes, which set out procedures to 'be followed by 
officials in order to prevent or relieve famine. Similar advances nad 
already ended famine'mortality in England in the seventeenth century - 
England’s-last. 'famine that killed' took place in 1621 - and in vfesterc 
Europe (with rare exceptions) during the eighteenth century. The same 
advances, chiefly under Communist rule, have ended China's appalling famine 
mortality in this century.
leading the files in the National Archives, I believed that I was 
watching the abolition of famine mortality in Southern Hhoaesia during the 
first quarter of the twentieth century. I already thought that famine 
mortality had been abolished at that time, or slightly earlier, in South 
Africa, whose last major 'famine that killed' took place during the 1690s, 
but that story had not yet been written. I thought, too, that famine 
mortality was brought under control in many parts of tropical Africa after 
1925, but again no historian has yet told this story in detail. The chance 
to do sc for Southern Rhodesia was irresistible, especially because the 
colony's records are unusually detailed because it was governed unusually 
closely.
1 therefore did two things. I incorporated my initial impression of 
the colonial period into-a genera1, book on the history of poverty .in Africa, 
and I decided to extend my research on Zimbabwe until it would support a 
short, book on the history of famine and its control there. This book is the 
result. It consists of accounts of the nine most serious food shortages 
between 1b90 and I960, the aim being to show how scarcity and its relief 
changed over tne period. The book is based on official -reports in the 
National Archives, supplemented from contemporary newspapers, mission' 
records, and secondary works. That is a limited range of sources and it is 
therefore a limited book. Its conclusions may well be refuted by other 
sources, if they can be found.
’As I wont deeper into the evidence, however, 1 realised that tuy initial 
impression was often wrong. The following chapters set out a more 
complicated history of famine in hinbabwe. Its chief elements are -is 
follows. ‘
First, the sparse evidence from pre-colonial Zimbabwe suggests that 
deaths from famine•were uncommon. Brought and scarcity were common enough, 
and so are oral traditions of their horrors, but hard evidence of mortality 
is scarce and virtually confined to those famines which were caused or 
worsened by•violence. except in those cases, the peoples of pre-colonial 
Zimbabwe appear to have established their own controls over famine, 
mortality. The important evidence comes from missionaries who lived 
continuously in hatabeieland from 1699*
The history.of famine in the colonial period divides into three phases. 
The first, to 1922, saw much scarcity. The chief mortality, in 1896-7, was 
due to famine caused by violence. There followed four famines - in 1901, 
1912, 1916, and 1922 - which were mainly 'traditional' in form, 'in that they 
were due to drought and were worst in those areas least affected by the 
European presence, although colonial ds:r-pi ion was an increasingly 
important element as time passed. All these famines threatened severe 
mortality. None in fact caused it, partly because indigenous survival 
techniques persisted, partly because the colonial government gradually 
developed 1 system of relief comparable to (but apparently not drawn.
directly from) the Indian Famine Codes. TVianks to more efficient 
administration, transport, and trade, the famine of 1422 was the last in 
which any significant number of people clued.
Yet the pattern of famine and relief established by 1922 almost 
immediately gave way to a second phase. This vans a result of the triumph of 
European settlement. Signs of the change were apparent before 1922, but 
thereafter, they were dominant. From 1930, at least, land alienation and 
population growth were reducing total African grain production per head, 
although the effects were felt at different times in different regions.
They appeared first and most severely in the area most disrupted by European 
settlement, .-latabeieland, which now became the chief area of scarcity, along 
with remote pockets surviving in other regions. During the 1990s and 
1940s, moreover, scarcity came to be concentrated especially among the poor 
and weak, taking the form not of famine mortality but of endemic 
malnutrition. Meanwhile the dominant settler economy also took over 
the relief of scarcity. In the famine years of 1999, 1942, and 1947, it was 
not the Dative Affairs Department that dominated famine relief but the Maize 
Control Board, along with the white farmers who supplied its grain and the 
white traders who distributad it. Here lay the contrast between Southern 
Rhodesia and the Northern Nigeria described by Dr Watts, for in Southern 
Rhodesia capitalism ~ white capitalism - did triumph during the 1990s and 
create a new, capitalist system of famine control to replace the indigenous 
system.
Yet in the 1950s the pattern changed once more and a third phase began. 
Scarcity remained similar in character but become more acute as the agrarian 
crisis in the African reserves deepened. The result was seen in the famine 
of I960 - the last considered here because thereafter the public records are 
closed - and probably in the famines whic.h have since become increasingly 
frequent, culminating in the very severe dearth of 19&2-4. moreover, the 
famine of 1960 revealed that the settler capitalist economy could no longer 
handle famine without assistance, because it could no longer absorb the 
available labour and thereby enable the .hungry to purchase food. In i960, 
therefore, direct government relief was necessary for the first time since 
192.2, and this too subsequently became more common. The state filled the 
widening gaps in the capitalist system of controlling famine mortality, and 
the system held.
Overall, then, famine mortality did disappear from Southern Rhodesia in 
the colonial period, but had seldom been acute at any time. Non-fatal 
scarcity, on the other hand, remained as common ao before. It, may even have 
increased, especially in the late colonial period, but more significantly it 
changed, especially in its geographical location and social incidence. 
Similarly, the methods of controlling mortality and relieving need changed 
greatly, but their efficacy probably remained much the same.
The implications of these findings are considered in the conclusion. 
First it is necessary to present the evidence.
2. JFre-colonial famine
This chapter argues that although droughts and food shortages were 
common in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, famine mortality was rare, except whsn 
drought was exacerbated by violence (as in the early nineteenth century in 
the broad period of she ‘'Svt.si" invasions). The evidence for this is of two 
kinds. First, the oral traditions and written references to pro-colonial 
famine mortality are few (when compared with Ethiopia or Angola, for
example) ■ dubious ; - •. .. the aeco,--:. v of t in the muteda ;-,.in.'-.dom in
c. 145O-B0 sounds suspiciously, like the concealment of a defeat winch ended 
nor>:n.i hj c,! expansion, while-de oousa's account of famine after Gilveira’s 
death- in 15^1 sounds too providential to be true), second, and more 
important, although the L>.ri missionaries resident in databelel&cd from 1859 
frequently described scarcity (especially in 1359-62 and in the. KidQs), they 
never described serious famine mortality. as Carnegie put it, "F.fnine, • 
though much talked- about, is very selaom- seen". - •
The chief reasons for the rarity of' famine mortality wore environmental 
variety,and the extreme localisation of rainfall (so that there was nearly 
always food not too far away), cultivating skills, storage techniques, great 
knowledge of wild produce (us described by Scudder for the Tonga, and aided 
by the vary sparse population), the absence of the epidemic discuses 
associated with famine elsewhere in Africa (illustrated by the calmness with 
which smallpox whs treated in Zimbabwe , in the early colonial period), ..-.nd 
the .absence of pastoraiists (so vulnerable to famine elsewhere).
h;.r and famine, 1d9b-7
Tiie famine in hatafceleland late m  18y6 and early in 1 By/ was the only 
famine of the colonial period to cause very numerous deaths, They were 
especially serious in. northern hatabeleland (where Gielgud in April 1697 
estimated that "nearly one fourth of the population" had died) and in 
western i-iatabeloland. These were the two areas where the Harvest’of 1896 
had been worst, but the famine as a whole was not primarily due to drought, 
locusts, rinderpest, or other natural calamity but to the violence 
associated'with the insurrection and its repression. In mat sense the 
famine-continued pre-colonial patterns. In nshonalnnd there was scarcity 
but little if any famine mortality, People survived chiefly by exploiting 
wild produce. Government relief was severely constrained by transport 
difficulties, but a precedent for direct relief was established.
i. Famine along the rivers, 1
This famine was due to drought and too-: place chiefly ,ir- tue Jabi,
Lundi, and Zambezi, valleys, i.e. those areas least affected by European 
settlement and government. Because these areas were so remote, neither 
government nor iiuropean traders contributed much to famine relief; the food 
they aid provide was extremely expensive. Instead, peop.i survived by local 
exchange and by exploiting wild produce. Few in tne famine area would leave 
their families to work o 1st.-whore, Mortality is difficult to assess: 
possibly some hundreds died, many of them from a ’mild smallpox- This was a 
traditional famine overcome by traditional means,
5- The groat drought of 1912
inert- was severe drought at this time throughout the s.v.rcnra regions of 
Africa. In himbaove it- was worst in southern- Uushonaland in 1912, in 
southern Act,-heieland in 191 '"-'id, and m  the Zambezi valley almost 
continuously from 19’12 to 19' All were areas relatively little affected 
by- uu ropean settlement. The crisis in southern Mashenaland contrasted with 
its previous prosperity and resulted from the isolation from railway 
building which nr. Phxmister bins ueserib^d. us m  "nO v most famine victims 
rejected labour migration and survived by exensnya and exploiting the bush,
duropear. intervention Vf-.<s more important on this occasion. ‘;hlxn 
traders bought cuttle for European farms in exchange for maize yrovr on 
those farms; for the first time famine and white settlement into r&cte 3
j
extensively. Governtj..-n.t also organised .an elaborate relief operation in 
southern Hasaonsland. i'he principles, laid down by 5ir William Hilton, 
broadly followed Indian and South African models of famine relief: it was to 
be left wherever possible to private traders; only the incapacitated should 
receive the issues; pauperisation was to be avoided at all costs. in 
practice these principles broke down in Chibi, N'danga, Bikita, and southern 
Helsetter districts, where free grain had to be issued to avert imminent 
starvation. Animal transport functioned only with great difficulty, but 
deaths were probably no more than in . 1 %'p. This was again largely' a 
traditional famine, due to drought, worst in the lowveld, and met by 
traditional devices. But the European contribution to causation and relief 
was more significant than before.
a. The Wdanga famine, 1916
although there was scarcity in several areas in 1916, it was especially 
serious in udanga and Bikita, where a classic relief operation was needed to 
prevent mass starvation. (The documentary evidence on this operation is 
unusually full). The famine was due to drought, but it was acute in Hdanga 
and Bikita because they hud been impoverished first by. their isolation and 
then by the famine of 1ylk, from which they had never Recovered. Ihile 
European traders (seeking cattle for the wartime market) supplied grain to 
other regions, Brianga and Bikita were too poor even to attract traders.
Hence they needed government relief on an unprecedented scale (some pO,(XX) 
bags of grain). With Hilton gone, relief policy was formulated by the CHC, 
li.J. Taylor. ’He organised better preparatory measures than before, 
instituted official oversight of grain pricers, and eased the restraints on 
emergency issues of free food. He.did not organise famine relief works, as 
was normal in India, because settler farms demanded.the available labour. 
Taylor claimed that nobody .11 d of "...line 1.,. 1 y 16. A few may have done, but 
not many.
Y. Transitional famine, 19TT
This widespread famine was worst in remote areas, but otherwise many 
traditional patterns gave way to a new kind of scarcity. The dearth of 1 922 
was due not to a sequence of bad years (as normally in the past) hut to a 
single harvest failure, indicating that storage techniques were breaking 
down in face of the case economy and tnat more Africans were becoming 
dependent on the market. The famine was exacerbated by the collapse of 
cattle prices during the postwar depression. There is less mention of bush 
produce and more of labour migration. But it 1922, for the first time 
during a famine, workers often could not find jobs. On this occasion, 
therefore, government relief weeks (chiefly road-building for the new motor 
car) were opened for the only time before 1390. in addition, Taylor's 
Native Department ran its biggest relief operation ever, supplying 67,91)1 
bags of grain, although much more was supplied by private European traders. 
Home deaths took place among veak and vulnerable groups in outlying areas 
which animal transport could not reach. In the aftermath the Native 
Department for the first time debated how to prevent famine in future. 'It 
decided to encourage drought-resistant manioc, but this never won 
acceptance in Southern Hhodesia.
3. Depression and searcity, 1y33
This was the firs* famine (or really only a scarcity) of a new type.
It was centred in •latabelelsnd, where massive land alienation' was now 
breeding almost endemic food shortage, overstocking, and extrema
vulnerability, .to drought.- All the subsequent scarcities considered here '(in 
1942, 1.94-7, and 1960) • wore especially serious in llatabeleland, although they 
sere also often.bad m  tie remote river valleys. That of 1933 was worsened 
by the depression, cattle prices once more collapsing and jobs becoming 
scarce. There were no identifiable deaths in 1953, but instead morn 
evidence -.-than before of endemic poverty (e.g. in the form of debt). This 
scarcity took place at exactly the moment, according to uosley1 s statistics, 
when African grain production per head fell significantly and permanently.
Xn 1993, therefore, African survival in dearth depended or. production from 
European farms, as was symbolised by the fact that famine relief was 
controlled r.ot by the i-iative department - which, following Taylor's 
retirement, largely withdrew from this responsibility - but by the newly- 
created Maize Control Board, supplying l-’.uropean-grown grain, at stabilised 
and relatively high prices, by rail and lorry to the white traders who were 
its agents. A new, effective, capitalist system of famine relief had come 
into being to replace both the indigenous system and the governmental 
expedients of the early colonial period.
9. dar and scarcity, 1942
There was famine throughout Africa during the Second World War, as also 
more terribly in India, doutnern Rhodesia's scarcity of 1942 was 
precipitated by a relatively minor drought, made serious by the difficulty 
of importing grain during wartime, and was worst in iiatsbeleland and the 
Zambezi Valley. But it was far less .serious than in many parts of Africa, 
partly because Southern Rhodesia profited in many ways from the war (cattle 
prices went relatively nigh and labour in strong demand} and partly because 
the Maize Control board's system of famine relief was probably the most 
efficient in the continent. Only one famine death has been found in 1$42.
10. Peace and scarcity, 1947
1947 was potentially a very severe crisis. It saw the worst drought of 
the colonial period (only one-third of normal rainfall in jiulawayo and Fort 
Victoria) at a time when food otcccs were low and imports extremely 
difficult to obtain. Famine again concentrated in the Zambezi Valley, where 
there were a few deaths, and in nntabeleland, 'where the crisis of African 
agriculture was deepening as high wartime prices ini.tinted the great 
expansion of European farming which n s  to continue into the 1970s. Yet, 
despite much hunger, the capitalist system of food supply did just cope.
Tone was issued free and less than 1,000 worth on credit, but Africans 
bought some 900,000 bags of grain during 1947 for some 790,000, spending 
"receipts from cattle sales ana wage-labour. There was no lack of jobs and 
no need for relief works. Government officials (as distinct from the .Maize 
Control board) did little more than enforce price controls. One indication 
of the strains inherent in the new system surfaced for the first time in 
indications of endemic malnutrition among children.
11. Prosperity and scarcity, 1y60
In 1960 the capitalist system, of famine control began to break down.
The 1950s had been perhaps the most prosperous decaae since the 1t>70s. 
African grain output had partly recovered, wmle European farming had 
boomed. But the cost had been increased pressure on African land, the 
creation of a larger impoverished class ^especially by the Land husbandry 
Act), and greater dependence on wage employment. When drought struck in 
1960, especially in I:-.vt a be Inland, the capitalist economy could no longer 
employ all those seeking work - as butcliffe showed, per capita GDP turned
down in 1900 after many years of growth - and the capitalist technique of 
relieving famine by means of wage-employment no longer worked effectively. 
In 19*30, for the first time since 1922, Government had to intervene with 
food' issues ( 2d,000 was owed for food at the end of the year) and relief 
works, oeveral Native Commissioners noted that unprecedented numbers of 
elderly and disabled people were in need of aid. Others noted widespread 
malnutrition and frank starvation among children. A pattern of endemic 
malnutrition, recurrent scarcity, and repeated Government relief .'.ms taking 
snapsi To .judge from Dr. Leys ’s work in Chivi in 1982-4, it may still 
exist.
12. Conclusion
The peoples of pre-colonial Zimbabwe suffered recurrent' scarcity but 
normally prevented it from causing numerous deaths. 'Famines that killed’ 
appear to have occurred when violence intensified ijcarcity. This pattern 
survived into the early colonial period, but when the strains of colonial 
change began to reinforce the effects of drought, Government created a new 
system of famine relief which operated most fully in 19-22. Thereafter, 
however, the growing dominance of settler capitalism changed the nature of 
famine and its relief. Famine in peripheral districts gave way to scarcity 
in areas of intensive unite settlement, especially matabeleland. The i-ibiae 
Control hoard, • with its European suppliers and distributors, replaced the 
'dative Affairs Department as relief agency. This system still operated in 
I960, but by then settler capitalism found it increasingly difficult to 
prevent ot relieve scarcity among a more numerous and impoverished African, 
population.
The crisis of capitafirm eppirent in tbe scarcity of 19‘>0 probably 
reappeared in all the numerous shortages of m e  next 25 years, but this book 
ends in I960 because its chief sources the records of the colonial 
government ~ are not yet available thereafter. It is important to stress in 
this conclusion hew narrowly-based those sources are. hueh research remains 
to be done on the history of famine in Zimbabwe, from both private papers 
and oral traditions. Ouch research .’ill probably destroy many of the 
arguments presented here, moreover, there is no reason to think that 
Zimbabwe's famine history is any guide to those of other African countries. 
Zach requires its own investigation.
This book many serve purpose by providing a preliminary history of 
famine in one country. But it does not serve the purnose for which the 
research was undertaken. • Trie original hypo thesis was that famine end' its 
control might be the key to Zimbabwe's remarkable population history, 
explaining why the population was so small in 1b90 and why it grew so soon 
and so quickly thereafter. The evidence of this book is that the original 
hypothesis was false. In Zimbabwe - although not necessarily elsewhere in 
Africa. - famine mortality was not the main constraint on pre-colonial 
population. Control of famine mortality in the colonial period cannot 
explain why population grew so early in the twentieth century. But colonial 
innovations can largely explain how population continued to grow.so.rapidly 
without suffering disastrous famine mortality. That is why the study of 
twentieth-century methods of preventing mortality is not 'highly specious', 
as Dr 'laths has complained, but highly relevant.. i
flevertneless, the problem of Zimbabwe's population history ■ .remains 
largely unsolved. it is one of the most important, fascinating,' and 
difficult problems’presented by•the country's history. ■
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